Introduction
The 1979 Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan commenced with a notably effective invasion. However, it ended a decade later with the withdrawal of Soviet forces after a costly and ineffectual war. This paper will analyze the Soviet military strategy for the intervention and examine how initial success turned into ultimate failure. Specifically, it will show that the Soviets did not achieve their political objectives in Afghanistan due to miscalculations of human and moral factors resident in the Afghan insurgency, rigidity in doctrine and strategy that disallowed effective adaptation to changing circumstances, inherent weaknesses in the Soviet political and military system, and the ultimate realization that the costs of the war far exceeded its potential benefits.
Historical and Political Context
Historians trace the roots of Russian interest in Central Asia to the 1682-1725 rule of Peter the Great. However, Russia's first attempt at expansion into modern-day Afghanistan did not occur until 1837, when a Russian-backed Persian force failed to annex the city of Herat after British military and diplomatic support allowed local forces to prevail. This incident foreshadowed the continued Russo-British confrontations of "The Great Game" that ensured the existence of the Afghan state as a buffer between the two contending powers. iv By the end of 1979, the stage was set for Soviet military intervention. The most important reason to move troops was to stabilize the situation in the main areas of the country: in the capital, around the capital, and in the provincial centers. We supposed that when our troops were stationed there, their very presence would stabilize the situation. We were not planning to engage in any combat actions…. 
Political Objectives

Military Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
In examining the military capabilities of both the DRA military and the resistance, the Soviets-as previously noted in the quote from General Varennikov-assumed that the Afghans would pose little to no opposition to the invasion. The Red Army had gained significant experience and enjoyed increasing success in prosecuting "stability operations" in Ukraine (1945 -1951 ), East Germany (1953 ), Hungary (1956 ), and Czechoslovakia (1968 
Soviet Strategic Concept
The Soviets envisioned a rapid intervention to initially establish control over the DRA military, capital, and key facilities while "stabilizing" the DRA government and the country as a whole. Relative to the Mujahideen resistance, they anticipated a limited war against a limited insurgency. The Soviets considered neither conquest nor full-scale occupation, nor did they anticipate a protracted guerrilla war. In fact, one of the overriding goals of Soviet strategy was to limit the level of military commitment applied to Afghanistan. The Soviets, however, appeared to neglect one military objective-that of closing the Pakistan frontier to prevent foreign assistance from reaching the Mujahideen. While initially not a key consideration, failure to achieve this end proved critical to the ultimate Soviet failure in Afghanistan. Further, it was indicative of Soviet miscalculations relative to the Mujahideen resistance and its ability to garner international support. Finally, it served to portend Soviet inability to prevail in counterinsurgency operations against a determined guerrilla foe.
The unexpected level of mujahideen resistance, coupled with the disappointing performance of the DRA military, served to extend and expand Soviet operations in Afghanistan.
In February-March 1980 the Soviets attacked into the Kunar Valley in the first of a continuing sequence of major offensives. The 5000-man force was supported by substantial air power and demonstrated that it could maneuver with impunity and displace the local populace. However, it proved incapable of scoring a decisive victory against the elusive Mujahideen, who utilized the advantages of the dissected "home turf" to withdraw in the face of superior Soviet power. At the conclusion of the offensive, the Soviet force withdrew, and the resistance returned. 
Conclusion
It may appear difficult to understand how the Soviets so grossly miscalculated the situation in Afghanistan given their direct economic, military, and political involvement in Afghan affairs dating from the 1950s. However, one can draw several conclusions for the reasons that Soviet military strategy ultimately failed to achieve the stated political objectives in Afghanistan.
The primary error of Soviet military strategists was the underestimation of the resolve and abilities of the Mujahideen resistance and the Afghan populace that supported it. While planning and execution of the initial stages of the intervention were nearly flawless, the invasion's success can largely be attributed to the application of speed, surprise, and overwhelming force against a weak, compliant, and static regime. After the initial shock wore off, however, the Soviets faced an unanticipated challenge to which they responded poorly.
The Soviets were probably blinded, at least partially, by overconfidence in their military capabilities relative to Afghanistan and insecurities related to the Cold War environment.
Nevertheless, their failure to recognize the dominant role that human and moral factors play in war is difficult to rationalize. The Soviets' sustained prosecution of their original limited war strategy-against an adversary who approached the conflict as absolutely total-was a recipe for disaster. Compounding their underestimation of Mujahideen resolve was their overestimation of the abilities of the DRA government and military forces to consolidate power and gain control of the Afghan state.
The Soviets' rigidity in doctrine and strategy also contributed to their failure in Afghanistan. Although Soviet forces incrementally adapted to the changing character of the war, they were unable or unwilling to do so efficiently or effectively enough to defeat the resistance. 
